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The SALT Process and Its Use in
Regulating Mobile ICBM's
In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the first
round of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) wi'th agree-
ments limiting anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's) and creating interim
limits on offensive nuclear weapons.' This Note develops criteria for
evaluating arms limitation agreements, and investigates the potential
for using the SALT II agreements to regulate* the deployment of land-
based and air-based mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (mo-
bile ICBM's). It concludes that an agreement banning or limiting the
deployment of mobile ICBM's would be in the best interests of the
United States, and would be worth specified concessions on the part
of this country. This conclusion, however, is dependent upon the
strategic context in the foreseeable future, and must be made with
reservations concerning the relative strengths of United States and
Soviet forces.
I. The Process of Creating Law in SALT
Arms control is a process of agreement for mutual restraint or co-
operative action between potential enemies, in order to reduce the
likelihood of war, or the severity of war if it occurs. 2 SALT is a
specific arms control process aimed at maintaining world order3 by
creating sanctions against the deployment of specified numbers and
types of strategic nuclear weapons. 4 The goal of SALT extends also to
1. J. NEWHOUSE, COLD DAWN: THE STORY OF SALT (1973); SALT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1970's (W. Kintner & R. Pfaltzgraff eds. 1973); SALT: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS (M. Kaplan ed. 1973). See generally STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1972, at 1-49 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
SIPRI YEARBOOK 1972); STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WORLD ARMAMENTS
AND DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1973, at 1-39 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SIPRI YEARBOOK
19731.
2. T. SCHELLING & M. HALPERIN, STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL 77 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as SCHELLING & HALPERIN].
3. World minimum order is defined as the effective prevention and repression of
violence or coercion. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 121-22 (1961) [hereinafter cited as MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO].
4. Sanctions are techniques and strategies for supporting world order, involving the
expectations and practices of reward or deprivation. They cannot be divorced from the
context in which they operate because they are integral to it. Reisman, Sanctions and
Enforcement, in 3 THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 275 (C. Black & R. Falk
eds. 1971). See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 287-88; M. McDOUGAL, H. LASS-
WELL & I. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 404 (1963) [hereinafter cited as MC-
DOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIc].
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creating expectations5 that strategic weapons will not be used, and
that appropriate sanctioning authority exists to discourage their use. 6
In an important sense, all members of the international community
are involved in the sanctioning process because they would all be af-
fected by a nuclear war.7 Understanding this process is also impor-
tant because similar sanctions will one day be needed to regulate
technologies that pose much greater threats to world order."
A. Sanctioning Objectives in SALT
Analysis of the legal process of SALT is facilitated by examining
the process in terms of the five ordinary objectives of any sanctioning
process: prevention, deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation, and recon-
struction.9 The comprehensive realization of these objectives will
achieve the broader goals of SALT.' 0
Prevention. Prevention is achieved by creating a preference among
nations not to resort to violence or threats of violence in order to
5. Expectations are assumptions about events wherever located in the continuum of
time. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 285.
6. The preamble to the ABM agreement reads in relevant part:
[This agreement is made in consideration] that effective measures to limit anti-
ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic
offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving
nuclear weapons ....
Treaty with the U.S.S.R. on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26,
1972, [1972, part 4] 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as SALT Treaty].
7. The participants are not only states, but all individuals, groups and other en-
tities. Many are participants not only because they are faced with extinction by nuclear
weapons, but also because all who play effective roles in power processes in the world
arena may participate in the process of sanctions. McDOUGAL g- FELICIANO, supra note 3,
at 281-82. For various effects of SALT upon nonparty states, see SALT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
Ames CONTROL IN THE 1970's, supra note 1, at 199-312.
8. Threats to future order may come from technological advances that make possible
weapons which are both less expensive and more difficult to detect than current strategic
nuclear weapons, yet have the same human destructive capability. Examples include
biological and chemical weapons, genetically oriented weapons, and weather-modification
systems. Terminal guidance missiles (cruise missiles) are small nuclear missiles with self-
correcting radar guidance systems, giving them extremely high accuracy. Although cruise
missiles are still in the testing stage, if they are ever deployed, their smaller size and
relatively low cost will make them more difficult to verify and hence more difficult to
limit through arms control. Their extremely high accuracy will make them inherently
counterforce weapons, for use against enemy missile silos rather than against civilian
population centers (which would not require such high accuracy). If Soviet missiles were
made vulnerable they might well be replaced with mobile weapons, triggering a new
arms race and new threats to world order. K. TsiPIs, OFFENSIVE MISSILES 27-28 (Stockholm
Int'l Peace Research Institute Paper 5, 1975) [hereinafter cited as OFFENSIVE MIssILES]. The
Department of Defense estimates that such weapons could be made operational in the
late 1970's. J. SCHLESINGER, ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1975, at 65
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL DEFENSE DEP'T REPORT FY 1975].
9. See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 261-383. The sanctioning goals are
discussed in the context of arms negotiations in McDoUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra
note 4, at 416-36, 450-77. See generally R. ARENS & H. LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC
ORDER 171-259 (1961).
10. See McDOUGAL &' FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 288.
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work their will in international disputes. 1' SALT is one of a long
series of attempts to prevent conflict by regulating armaments. 2 This
objective is also implicit in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter,
which urges "effective collective measures for the prevention and re-
moval of threats to the peace"' 3 and Article 26 which requires that
the Security Council promote and maintain peace by formulating plans
for the reduction of armaments.
14
SALT attempts to prevent breaches of world order by creating a
recurring dialogue between the United States and Soviet Union which
will anticipate situations of force imbalances that would make the
use of coercion attractive to one of the parties. 15 An imbalance in force
levels will affect the expectations of all states during periods of crisis."3
If one party anticipates that it will be at a strategic disadvantage in
the future, it will be encouraged toward immediate coercive acts, be-
fore its posture becomes relatively weakened.' 7 Conversely, the posi-
tion of strategic superiority could later be used to the stronger state's
advantage.' 8
Even if an imbalance is insufficient for one side to dominate the
other militarily, it is possible for strategic imbalances to create diplo-
11. Id.
12. For a discussion of arms control prior to the League of Nations experience, see
P. NOEL-BAKER, DISARMAMENT (1926). For the experiences of the League, as well as other
arms negotiations between the World Wars, see J. WHEELER-BENNETT, DISARMAMENT AND
SECURITY SINCE LOCARNO 1925-1931 (1932); H. WEHBERG, THE OUTLAWRY OF VAR (1931).
Arms negotiations since World War II are summarized in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
HISTORY OF DISARMAMENT IN THE POSTWAR YEARS (Special Rep. 1964); and discussed in B.
BECHHOEFER, POSTWAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL (1961).
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 26 reads:
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and
security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic
resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating.., plans... for
the regulation of armaments.
15. The preamble to the ABM Treaty in SALT I states the intention of "relaxation of
international tension" and considers SALT's preventative intent as creation of an atmos-
phere where additional arms control is encouraged:
[The parties make this agreement] [p]roceeding from the premise that the limitation
of anti-ballistic missiles systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to
the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more
favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms.
SALT Treaty, supra note 6. Sufficiency and parity of strategic forces and a credible
second-strike ability must be perceived by each side in order to maintain a balance of
interests. W. CLEMENS, THE SUPERPOWERS AND ARMS CONTROL 58 (1973).
16. This interdependence is illustrated by the importance attached in both SALT I
and II to the status of the United States forces stationed in Europe. The ultimate dis-
position of this issue will seriously influence both the European governments and the
NATO alliance. Frye, Untying the SALT Knot, Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 1974, at C3, col. 1;
Kemp & Smart, Salt and European Nuclear Forces in SALT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS
CONTROL IN THE 1970's, supra note 1, at 199-236.
17. T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 232-33 (1963) [hereinafter cited as THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT].




matic or ideological leverage. 19 This leverage would include propa-
ganda or the advantage of a superior bargaining position in future
arms negotiations. The relative strengths of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
would affect their prestige in the international community if one had
a substantially lower, albeit militarily sufficient, strategic force level. 20
There is also a domestic political cost involved, since leaders of both
countries want their military to be "second to none."2 1
There are various pressures working upon both the United States
and Soviet Union which tend to create imbalances. Each side con-
tinues to develop weapons because it fears having a weaker force than
the other. There is also concern that an advantage in strategic tech-
nology might have spin-off uses in nonstrategic weapons. 2 2 SALT can
lessen these potential imbalances by banning specified new weapons
systems, thus reducing the incentive to develop new technologies. 23
Another pressure which may cause imbalances is the desire of both
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to maintain flexible responses to violations of
world order. Some flexibility is necessary in order for responses to be
proportionate to the violation. If proportionate responses are not avail-
able, world order is jeopardized because violations might escalate if
met inappropriately. 24 Imbalances will result, however, if the new
weapons or practices which are developed for flexibility in responding
also create new potential for initiating coercion. The SALT dialogue
19. "Neither the USSR nor the United States has, or can hope to have, a capability to
launch a disarming first strike against the other...." ANNUAL DEFENSE DEP'T REPORT FY
1975, supra note 8, at 4. Diplomatic coercion employs communications and negotiations
between leaders or officials in various states. Ideological coercion uses manipulation and
circulation of symbols and propaganda to influence patterns of expectations and demands
in target audiences. ,fcDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 28-29. Situations of force
imbalances, because of their diplomatic or propaganda potential, create expectations of
value gain from coercion. The amount of imbalance necessary to create ideological, diplo-
matic or economic advantage is hotly debated. A. QUANBECK & B. BLECHMAN, STRATEGIC
FORCES: IssUES FOR THE MID-SEVENTIES 10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as QUANBECK & BLECH-
MAN]. There is no doubt, however, that nuclear weapons pose many threats other than
their use in a massive attack. ANNUAL DEFENSE DEP'T REPORT FY 1975, supra note 8, at 27.
20. The preamble to the ABM Agreement, by recognizing that SALT I would con-
tribute to favorable conditions for additional arms control, implicitly recognizes the
necessity of balanced forces if effective force limitations are to be implemented. See note
13 supra. This relationship and the current imbalance in MIRV levels has been a source
of pessimism over possible SALT II MIRV limitations. OFFENSIVE MISSILES, supra note 8,
at 30-32.
21. For example, President Nixon once stated that "[w]e must never allow America to
become the second strongest nation in the world." STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1974, at 70-71 (1974).
22. See Long, Growth Characteristics of Military Research and Development, in IMPAcT
OF NEw TECHNOLOGIES ON THE ARMS RACE 279 (B. Feld, T. Greenwood, G. Rathjens & S.
Weinberg eds. 1971). No technological development will have an easily defined impact.
It is difficult, for example, to classify space technology as having unequivocal uses. Mc-
DOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIc, supra note 4, at 388.
23. See generally SIPRI YEARBOOK 1972, supra note 1, at 47.
24. Sohn, Responses to Violations, in SECURITY IN DISARMAMENT 179 (R. Barnet & R.
Falk eds. 1965).
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is a means of avoiding these imbalances through the regulation of the
flexible responses. If military responses are developed, the SALT dia-
logue can identify and control their coercive potential. SALT can also
help to create nonmilitary methods of response 25 which are truly re-
sponses and do not carry potential for initiating military coercion. 21
A final pressure which may cause imbalances is not international
in origin, but arises from each side's bureaucracy.21 There are pres-
sure groups in both nations which constantly advocate new weapons
programs. 28 If a state has a slightly weaker strategic force, or if such
a weakness is anticipated, the pressures to increase armament levels
may become irresistible.
There are three problems with SALT's attempt at prevention. First,
SALT does not address itself to the whole of preventive requirements
for world order; there are still far too many pressures operating on
each side which make it desirable to gain even limited strategic su-
periority. Even if both the United States and Soviet Union pursue
a policy of essential equivalence with respect to their strategic weapons,
there are still a great many areas of international conflict and bureau-
cratic pressure which create incentives for new weaponry in order
to obtain transitory strategic superiority. While attempting to control
all the forces leading to hostility between the two nations may be out-
side the scope of discussions on strategic weapons, the goal of preven-
tion will never be reached until the negotiations include controls over
the underlying causes of force imbalance.
29
Second, attempts at prevention are discouraged because of the dif-
ficulty in negotiating the disparate arsenals of the United States and
25. For examples of nonmilitary methods of prevention in SALT, see the discussion of
the substantive agreements concluded at SALT during 1971 in SIPRI YEARBOOK 1972,
supra note 1, at 36-37.
26. Although economic or diplomatic sanctions might escalate into military confronta-
tion, their availability does not amount to a new military threat with potential for causing
imbalances. Multiple-warhead missiles (MIRV's) are an example of a military response,
developed for deterrence, which can cause imbalances. See p. 1083 infra. Any strategic
policy which places exaggerated emphasis on the military instrument to the exclusion
of others is suspect. McDouGAL, LASSWELL & VLAsic, supra note 4, at 422 n.165. Reliance
upon only one possible military response within the military instrument would be
worse. The debate between strategies of "massive retaliation" versus "flexible response"
was resolved in favor of the latter during the 1950's. But see Aron, The Evolution of
Modern Strategic Thought, in PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY 23 (Stud. in Int'l Security
No. 14, 1970). Recent U.S. policy has emphasized creating flexible strategic potential to
provide military and psychological deterrence. Finney, Debate Over Change on Nuclear
Strategy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1974, at 10, col. 1.
27. G. RATHJENS, A. CHAYES & J. RuINA, NUCLEAR Ams CONTROL AGREEMENTS: PROCESS
AND IMPACT 45-63 (1974) [hereinafter cited as RATHJENS, CHAYES & RUINA]; Chayes, An
Inquiry Into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 83 HARv. L. Rrv. 905, 909 (1972).
28. See Burns, The Defense Sector: An Evaluation of Its Economic and Social Impact,
in THE WAR ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES 120 (S. Melman ed. 1971); Chayes, supra
note 27, at 916.
29. See MGDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLAsIc, supra note 4, at 486-87.
1082
Vol. 84: 1078, 1975
The SALT Process
Soviet Union30 into two strategic forces whose capabilities are essen-
tially equivalent. In general, the United States strategic force has more
warheads, technical sophistication and accuracy, while the Soviet force
has more launchers and larger warheads.3 ' In order to define equiva-
lence it has been necessary to develop common denominators among
weapons so that they can be compared.
Reconciliation of forces with differing capabilities is a recurring
problem in attempts at arms control. The proper method of comparing
different types of forces is not only to measure the relative destruc-
tion or "kill" ratios, but also to focus on allowing force levels which
reflect strategic needs.32 The strategic equivalence equation should
not only include factors such as missile accuracy, and the number and
size of warheads, launchers and MIRV's, but should also reflect each
state's perception of its needs. 33 The United States should be prepared
to make concessions to the Soviets depending on our relative strategic
needs. While the critical problem is to establish a method of compari-
son, the answer is not to assume that equivalence is necessary or that
a single number can be determined for prolonged use. The solution
is contextual: each nation must be allowed a force sufficient to fill
its strategic needs, which are different in every case.
34
Earlier arms control efforts in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922
and the London Naval Treaties of 1930 and 1936 encountered similar
problems in an attempt to find a means of equating disparate weapons
forces.35 Like the offensive weapons agreement in SALT, the Wash-
ington and London Treaties placed numerical limits on force levels
without actually banning whole weapons systems.36 The treaties set
limits for ship tonnage which were sufficiently high to allow for
30. SIPRI YEARBOOK 1973, supra note 1, at 52-54.
31. OFFENSIVE MISSILES, supra note 8, at 20; T. MOORER, UNITED STATES MILITARY
POSTURE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975, at 2, 27-28 (Mar. 5, 1974).
32. The trend in SALT has been much the opposite. Numerical concessions were
made in SALT I by the United States in consideration of its qualitative superiority, but
in general both sides have seen throw-weight imbalances or potential imbalances as
justification for building new weapons. See OFFENSIVE MISSILES, supra note 8, at 30.
33. Bull, Strategic Arms Limitations: The Precedent of the Washington and London
Naval Treaties, in SALT: PROBLEMS AND PROSI'ECr-S, supra note 1, at 50-51.
34. Bull, supra note 33, at 42.
35. Id. at 27-28.
36. The Washington conference ratios gave Britain and the United States "parity" of
naval cruiser force levels while the Japanese were allowed three-fifths of this level.
Comparisons were made on the basis of tonnage and combat effectiveness. See generally
CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT: WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 12, 1921-
FEBRUARY 6, 1922, at 446-57 (1922); R. BUELL, THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 143, 153-63
(1922); Y. ICHIHASIH, THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND AFTER 46-59 (1928). In 1938 the
London Conference extended the agreement between the United States and Great Britain,
while the Japanese were allowed to increase their force levels. Bull, supra note 33, at 38.
See generally DOCUMENTS OF THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 1935, at 5-24 (1936); L.
MORGAN, THE BACKGROUND OF THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 66-67 (1930).
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changes in force levels in response to changes in perception of strategic
and economic needs, resulting, for example, from the Depression or
the rise of Nazi Germany. 37 There were differences, as well, within
the series of treaties because of changing strategic needs. In 1921, be-
fore the Washington Treaty, Britain had a clearly superior navy while
the United States Navy was expanding at a much faster pace.38 The
1922 Washington Treaty allotted the United States and Great Britain
equal tonnage in battleships and cruisers.39 In 1930, however, parity
was maintained by allowing the British more tonnage in light cruisers,
because they needed them to protect their worldwide maritime empire,
while the Americans were given a corresponding advantage in heavy
cruisers. 40 Thus, through sufficient flexibility in responding to chang-
ing needs and through periodical renegotiation, the Washington and
London Naval Treaties successfully limited ship construction (hence,
budget outlays for the military) for 15 years, until political develop-
ments apart from the treaties led to the outbreak of World War II. 4"
These treaties illustrate that arms control is a continuous process, and
that forces should not be compared on the basis of fixed ratios over
long periods of time.
The third factor which frustrates SALT's attempt at prevention is
the uncertainty of scientific advances which might be translated into
weapons breakthroughs. 42 Since both the United States and the Soviet
Union already possess weapons forces with assured massive destructive
capability, it is unlikely that new nuclear weapons which are directed
against civilian populations will create dramatic imbalances between
our forces. 43 It is more likely that new weapons which are directed
against enemy missiles (counterforce weapons) will be developed. Coun-
terforce weapons create imbalances by destroying the ability to re-
taliate against nuclear attack.44 Military strategy which relies on coun-
terforce ability is dubious, however, because of the large numbers of
diverse weapons that would have to be destroyed to make such a
strategy successful. Submarine-launched missiles, for example, are cur-
rently invulnerable to preemptive attack, and will remain so for the
37. Bull, supra note 33, at 45.
38. Id. at 31.
39. Id. at 32.
40. Id. at 36, 42.
41. Id. at 45.
42. Dyson, Arms Control and Technological Change, in SALT: PROBLEMS AND PROS-
PEers, supra note 1, at 201-19; Rathjens, Introduction: Technology and the Arms Race-
Where We Stand, in IMPACT OF NEw TECHNOLOGIES ON THE ARMS RACE, supra note 22,
at 1.
43. ANNUAL DEFENSE DEP'T REPORT FY 1975, supra note 8, at 4.
44. OFFENSIVE MISSILES, supra note 8, at 9-10.
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foreseeable future.45 Even if there were sudden technological break-
throughs in anti-submarine warfare, the lead time for development,
testing, and deployment would be considerable, during which time
other nations could react.
46
The evolution of more accurate weapons, however, does pose a
significant counterforce threat to immobile land-based missiles. 47 Either
a highly accurate multiple warhead missile (MIRV) or missiles with
terminal guidance could seriously threaten the retaliatory capability
of immobile missiles. 48 While this would not be a viable military
strategy because submarine-launched missiles and bombers would still
provide retaliation, the situation which results would cause imbal-
ances in force levels between the United States and the Soviet Union.
This imbalance would increase the chances of diplomatic or ideolog-
ical coercion, 49 and would spur each country's bureaucracy to urge
new weapons systems to reestablish equivalence. These results, either
new coercion capability or a new arms race, create potential for in-
stability and violations of world order.50
Deterrence. The second objective of the sanctioning process in SALT
is to deter violations of world order by creating expectations that any
use of coercion will be met by reciprocal response. 51 This is related
to the goal of prevention except that here the concern is to counteract
immediately posed threats.52 Military deterrence is the basic precept
and most common goal of strategic planning; forces are deployed so
that in response to any eventuality there is a guarantee of inflicting
an unacceptable level of damage.53 Even though major attention has
focused for years on military deterrence, expectations of diplomatic,
45. Morse, The Future of Sea-Based Deterrence, in THE FUTURE OF THE SEA-BASED
DE'TERREr 3-10 (K. Tsipis, A. Cahn 8- B. Feld eds. 1973). See Tsipis, Antisubmarine War-
fare-Fact and Fiction, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 16, 1975, at 145 [hereinafter cited as Anti-
submarine Warfare].
46. See Ruina, The Triad and U.S. Strategic Policy, in THE FUTURE OF THE SEA-BASED
DErERRENT, supra note 45, at 21.
47. See ANNUAL DEFENSE DEP'T REPORT FY 1975, supra note 8, at 57.
48. OFFENSIVE MISSILES, supra note 8, at 27-28. The major criterion for an effective
counterforce weapon is high accuracy since the blast wave from current nuclear weapons
(counterforce weapons) is insufficient to destroy an enemy silo unless it explodes very
close to the target. Id. at 11-12.
49. See pp. 1080-81 supra.
50. World order violations would be encouraged because the instabilities give a
violator the opportunity to realize objectives through coercion. See McDOUGAL &
FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 14-15.
51. Deterrence involves persuasively communicating to a potential violator that any
violation of world order will meet a response of sufficient magnitude to make the viola-
tion unattractive. Id. at 292.
52. Id. at 291. See generally McDOUCAL, LASSWIELL & VLAsic, supra note 4, at 469.
53. An unacceptable level of damage is defined as the destruction of approximately 25
percent of the enemy's population and industry. Ruina, supra note 46, at 15. The United
States has several times more strategic forces than necessary to cause unacceptable damage
to the U.S.S.R.
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ideological, and economic responses 54 to the use of nuclear weapons
for coercion also have a deterrent effect; there is a definite need for
a shift in focus and for consequent efforts to improve the effectiveness
of nonmilitary sanctions. 50 The United Nations would be only one
of the available forums for such a reaction. 0
The focus of SALT's attempt at deterrence is to assure that recipro-
cal responses are available, and that all parties are aware of their
availability and certain use.5 The ABM Treaty makes a military
response to coercion more certain, since it limits systems which can
intercept retaliatory missiles. 58 The rationale of the interim limits
on offensive weapons is to keep each side's launchers and warhead
strengths comparable, assuring that a situation will never exist where
one side cannot retaliate. 0
SALT's creation of a Standing Consultative Commission also pro-
vides a nonmilitary source of deterrence. a0 The Commission was es-
tablished to implement the provisions of the Treaty and create pro-
cedures for compliance."' The Commission considers any ambiguities
or questions of compliance, including possible violations, interference
with verification, changes in the strategic situation, and the need for
changes in the Treaty to increase its viability. -02 The Commission
provides a new diplomatic channel of communication, and a forum
for resolving disputes which might otherwise lead to disruptions of
world order. The Commission aids in deterrence by allowing either
party to express its intentions of responding to perceived Treaty viola-
54. Diplomacy can be used to inform a potential violator of the consequences of
violating world order. McDOUCAL, LASSWELL & VLAsic, supra note 4, at 423. Ideology can
be used when a violation is imminent, to undermine public support for the violator and
create public support for the sanctioner. Id. Economic sanctions which can be used for
deterrence include stopping trade, withholding foreign aid, reducing or refusing credits
or loan payments, freezing assets in the sanctioning state owned by the violator state or
its citizens, and terminating all economic relationships. Id. at 424; Sohn, supra note 24,
at 374.
55. The strength of the deterrent will vary contextually. If the violator state is
relatively small and not allied with a large bloc of states, economic sanctions should
result in compliance. Sohn, supra note 24, at 374. A superpower state which strongly
supports a violation will be less likely to be persuaded. Id. This is hardly surprising and
does not mean that nonmilitary sanctions are ineffective against powerful states. States,
no matter how powerful, will be deterred from violations of world order if their expecta-
tions of improving their position are maximized by avoiding violations. McDouGAL &
FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 286.
56. See A. GOTLIEB, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 154-56 (1965).
57. Thus intelligence is necessary to spread the information that deterrence is available.
See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, sup-a note 3, at 351; SCHELLING & HALPERIN, supra note 2,
at 34.
58. SIPRI YEARBOOK 1973, supra note 1, at 16-18.
59. Id. at 18.
60. SIPRI Y.ARBOOK 1973, supra note 1, at 15.
61. See Article XIII of the ABM Treaty and Article VI of the Interim Agreement on
Offensive Weapons, SALT Treaty, supra note 6.
62. SIPRI YEARBOOK 1973, supra note 1, at 15.
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tions, and creating the expectation that violations will be challenged. 3
The problem with SALT's attempt at deterrence is that the strategies
for obtaining this objective are perceived too narrowly. Deterrence will
not be adequately achieved unless SALT embraces all possibilities for
employing deterrent sanctions so as to discourage potential violators
of world order.04 Moreover, these sanctions must apply to other na-
tions besides the United States and the Soviet Union. Deterrence
is too often considered as a military function between two strategic
forces, rather than a general sanctioning objective of the entire world
community.06 SALT has made progress toward broadly designed de-
terrence, but it needs to incorporate more nonmilitary strategies.
7
Restoration. The third sanctioning objective of arms control agree-
ments involves provisions for taking actions which will aid in the
restoration of world order after that order has been challenged.
8
Responses to violations of world order must be immediate and appro-
priate to be successful in restoration.09 The Standing Consultative
Commission and the SALT negotiations themselves create new chan-
nels for diplomatic response to acts of coercion. The resulting agree-
ments help restore order by maintaining balanced force levels which
assure capability for military reciprocity.
Restoration has not been an explicit objective of SALT because
violations of world order using nuclear weapons are often considered
to end only in massive and widespread destruction. There are two
cases, however, where this would not be true. The first occurs when
the violation consists only of a few missiles being fired; the second
occurs when no missiles are fired, but their destructive potential is
used for coercion. In either of these situations it would be best to
63. See McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLAsIc, supra note 4, at 495, 497.
64. In particular, the SALT attempt at deterrence has focused upon avoiding situations
where either party has incentive toward coercion, rather than reducing the coercive
ability. See MCDOUCAL, LASSWELL & VLAsic, supra note 4, at 470; SIPRI YEARBOOK 1973,
supra note 1, at 16-17.
65. There are numerous discussions of the effect of the SALT Treaty upon other
nations. See SALT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1970's, supra note 1, at 199-
312; SALT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 136-200. Bringing other nuclear
powers into arms control negotiations and agreements is necessary to accomplish dis-
armament or to have effective arms limitation among states, but this could be done
through new negotiations as well as through SALT. Kinter, Arms Control for a Five-
Power World, in SALT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1970's, supra note 1, at
170.
66. ,CDOUGAL, LAsSWELL & VLAsIc, supra note 4, at 422 n.165.
67. Id.
68. NfcDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 293-94; see McDOUGAL, LASSWELL &
VLASic, supra note 4, at 425-32.
69. Sohn, supra note 24, at 179, 194-95. See generally SCHELLING & HALPERIN, supra
note 2, at 11-74.
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terminate the coercion without further escalation.70 Future SALT
discussions should give greater attention to the goal of restoration by
creating new and more flexible methods of response.71
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. Rehabilitation is the objective
of the sanctioning process concerned with reestablishing world order
and values after a violationJ 2 Whereas restoration is concerned with
taking action to stop violations of world order, rehabilitation is con-
cerned with the resumption of normal community processes with a
minimum of economic and social disturbance." Reconstruction en-
tails efforts made after a violation to prevent it from happening
again.74 Like the objective of restoration, these objectives are often
slighted because violations of world order where strategic arms are
involved are too often considered to be acts of massive, worldwide
destruction. Such destruction is not necessarily the consequence of
nuclear coercion and future SALT agreements should create pro-
cedures for rehabilitation and reconstruction of world order in cases
of limited nuclear attack, accident, or other coercive action.7 5
B. The Role of Verification
The SALT agreements also provide that neither party shall delib-
erately conceal weapons, and stipulate "national means of verifica-
tion" (primarily satellite surveillance) to ensure treaty compliance.'-
The SALT agreement on verification systems is crucial to deterrence
70. See Sohn, supra note 24, at 179; MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 293. The
Treaty violations could occur in various modes and intensities. See generally Barnet,
Violations of Disarmament Agreements, in SEcURIrY IN DISARMAMENT, supra note 24, at
157-77.
71. See A. GOTLIEB, supra note 56, at 156-62; Sohn, Adjudication and Enforcement in
Arms Control, in ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY 373-75 (D. Brennan
ed. 1961).
72. ACf.DOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 294-95.
73. Id. at 293-95.
74. Id. at 295-96; see Sohn, supra note 24, at 180-92, 194-202.
75. Barnet, supra note 70, at 162; see A. GOTLB, supra note 56, at 162; Sohn, supra
note 71, at 375.
76. Article XII of the ABM Treaty provides:
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its dis-
posal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international
law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this
article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which im-
pede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, as-
sembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
SALT Treaty, supra note 6. "National technical means of verification" include primarily
satellite reconnaissance, but also seismic and radar monitoring. See T. Greenwood, Re-
connaissance and Arms Control, SCIENTiFIC Am., Feb., 1973, at 24.
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because it signals the acceptance of a mutual ability to inspect and
verify that the Treaty has not been violated.77 The United States has
always taken the position that verification is a prerequisite to arms
control.78 Thus a preliminary or adjunct to any type of successful
arms negotiation has been the success of a separate agreement, im-
plicit or otherwise, which ensures to a high probability that violations
will be detected.
79
Verification systems do not necessarily aid in the establishment of
world order since the information obtained could be used to plan
an attack as well as to verify treaty compliance.8 0 Verification coupled
with weapons limits, however, creates deterrence if both sides have
weapons systems with assured retaliatory potential. The verification
information then becomes a communication of the other side's de-
terrent threat."' Since verification creates a high probability of cer-
tainty that violations will be detected, any violations which might
lead to breakdowns in world order are discouraged.82 Verification also
serves the goal of deterrence by creating stability during periods of
crisis. Again, if both sides' force levels have retaliatory ability, an
ability communicated to the other side through its verification sys-
tem, neither side will feel compelled to attack in fear that otherwise
it will be the victim of a preemptive attack.
83
Finally, the effect of the verification provision of the SALT agree-
ment is to provide diplomatic and ideological impact to verification
77. Verification has often been a preoccupation of both Soviet and United States
strategic planners. Absolute certainty in verification, however, while usually preferable,
is neither necessary nor always possible. If a state cannot, or does not intend to develop
a certain weapon, it is possible that the state would be willing to enter into an agree-
ment regulating that weapon, even if it could not verify the agreement. See Chayes,
supra note 27, at 946-47.
78. See H. KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 176-79 (3d ed. 1969);
SIPRI YEARBOOK 1973, supra note 1, at 60.
79. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra note 4, at 495.
80. SCHELLING 9& HALPERIN, supra note 2, at 36.
81. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis, the mood of seriousness and deter-
mination in the United States was communicated through troop movements and other
preparations. What was first expressed to the Soviets through means of their verification
channels was later given to them through diplomatic communication. Falk, The Cuban
Missile Crisis, in SECURITY IN DISARMAMENT, supra note 24, at 147-49. Similarly, the way
we equip our armed forces or deploy our nuclear weapons will reveal our intentions to
the Soviets. SCHELLING 9- HALPERIN, supra note 2, at 81.
82. Violations, to be worthwhile, would have to give the violator sufficient advantage
to compensate for the risk of the sanctions that would be imposed if the violation was
detected. Satellite surveillance gives substantial, but incomplete, information concerning
each side's military operations. This information is sufficient to assure there are no
violations adequate for military advantage. RATHJENS, CHAYES & RUINA, supra note 27, at
57; cf. Falk, The Limitations of Inspection for Drastic Disarmament, in SECURITY IN
DISARMAMENT, supra note 24, at 226-39.
83. This process uses verification to communicate the balance of destructive power
and the stability of that balance. THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT, supra note 17, at 232.
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information.84 The technical ability to verify through the use of re-
connaissance photography was not created by SALT, but the informa-
tion obtained has been given new authority and diplomatic effect.8 5
Not only does each side know that the other has the ability to detect
violations, but both have agreed that such reconnaissance is occurring
and that it is the primary method of detecting violations.8 The infor-
mation thus obtained will constitute more persuasive evidence of a
violation and have greater effect on world opinion.87 Similarly, the
Treaty provision effectively precludes either party from denying its
violations on the basis that satellite information is unpersuasive or
illegally obtained.88
II. The Mobile ICBM Debate
Mobile ICBM's are ballistic missiles which can be moved on railcars,
truck-beds, or airplanes and quickly readied for firing between con-
tinents.89 The major difference between mobile ICBM systems and
current ICBM systems is that the mobile missiles cannot be easily
monitored by satellite reconnaissance and therefore are less vulnerable
to enemy attack. In 1972, the United States urged that the SALT I
Agreement also limit mobile ICBM's, but the Soviets would not
agreeY0 The United States then unilaterally declared that the deploy-
84. Besides being imperfect, satellite information cannot apply sanctions by itself.
Political and bureaucratic forces are necessary for application, and are thus the most
important inducements to compliance in the context of extensive but incomplete in-
formation. RATHJENS, CHAYES & RUINA, supra note 27, at 57. See Pool, Public Opinion
and the Control of Armaments, in ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY,
supra note 71, at 333-46.
85. Greenwood, supra note 76, at 24. Pre-satellite, non-national means of verification
were challenged as illegal by both the United States and the Soviet Union. See H.
BERMAN & P. MAGGS, DISARMAMENT INSPECTION UNDER SOVIET LAw (1967); L. HENKIN, ARMS
CONTROL AND INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAW (1958). There has never been substantial
doubt as to the legality of satellite verification in the United States. D. ARONOwITZ,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 140 (1965).
86. SIPRI YEARBOOK 1973, supra note 1, at 60.
87. See generally Pool, supra note 84, at 338.
88. See SIPRI YEARBOOK 1973, supra note I, at 15. The present situation can be
favorably contrasted with that in which verification information obtained by U-2 recon-
naissance entailed legal problems when used as evidence for the application of sanctions.
See Falk, Respect for International Law and Confidence In Disarmament, in SECURITY IN
DISARMAMENT, supra note 24, at 214.
89. See generally QUANBECK & BLECHMAN, supra note 19, at 38. This Note does not
include submarine launched missiles within its discussion of mobile weapons because of
three distinguishing characteristics of submarine launched missiles. First, satellite recon-
naissance can verify submarine deployment by monitoring support facilities and sub-
marine construction. Second, submarine missiles are already extensively deployed and
their prohibition is not now contemplated. If prohibition were attempted, the fact that
submarine based missiles are already deployed would create a different set of problems.
See generally SIPRI YEARBOOK 1972, supra note I, at 47. Third, submarine launched
missiles have always been treated separately from other mobile missiles in SALT negotia-
tions. See generally THE FUTURE OF THE SEA-BASED DETERRENT, supra note 45.
90. T. MOORER, supra note 31, at 16.
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ment of mobile ICBM's was inconsistent with the objectives of the
Agreement.9' Subsequently, however, both the United States and the
Soviet Union have proceeded with research and development of new
mobile weaponsY2 The United States has continued, however, to state
its preference for limiting mobile weapons, making it likely that there
will be efforts to include mobile ICBM limitations in the SALT II
Treaty in June 1975. 93
A. General Arguments Favoring Mobile ICBM's
Arguments favoring mobile ICBM deployment in both the United
States and Soviet Union emphasize the objectives of prevention and
military deterrence, based on the maintenance of balanced force levels.
The Soviet Union perceives that its immobile land-based forces are
threatened by United States technological advances in high accuracy
warheads which might be used to attack Soviet missile installations.
The Soviets feel that they are confronted by a disadvantageous im-
balance in strategic forces, and seek to reestablish a balanced position
by deploying mobile ICBM's which would not be as vulnerable to an
attack by high accuracy weapons, because they are not fixed targets.
The United States perceives the Soviet unilateral deployment of mo-
bile ICBM's as itself causing an imbalance in force levels, and seeks
to avoid that imbalance by deploying mobile systems of its own. Thus
technological advances have led to a situation in which there are
arguments in both states to view deployment as a means of main-
taining balanced forces.
Imbalances can also be caused by economic and bureaucratic con-
sequences of deployment, which create reasons to deploy mobile weap-
ons even if there is no strategic need for them. Mobile ICBM deploy-
ment would require massive expenditures which would stimulate the
economy, provide jobs for domestic workers, and create profits for
defense industries.94 These economic benefits would generate their
own bureaucratic momentum for deployment. The vulnerability of
fixed-position ICBM's could also prove to be a political handicap to
leaders responsible for maintaining national security. None of these
91. Id.; ANNUAL DEFENSE DEP'T REPORT FY 1975, supra note 8, at 56.
92. ANNUAL DEFENSE DEP'T REPORT FY 1975, supra note 8, at 56-57. The amount the
United States now spends on mobile ICBM's is not large; it is significant because if it
leads to deployment, mobile ICBM's will consume a large portion of our defense budget.
QUANBECK & BLECHMAN, supra note 19, at 38.
93. See ANNUAL DEFENSE DEP'T REPORT FY 1975, supra note 8, at 56.
94. See Chayes, supra note 27, at 942. An interesting example of bureaucratic momen-
tum is that which gathered behind the Thor-Jupiter missile deployment projects. See
M. ARUAcOsT, THE PoLIIcs OF WEAPONS INNOVATION: THE THOR-JUPITER CONTROVERSY
210-18 (1969).
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arguments, however, are conditioned upon whether the mobile sys-
tems are really necessary to maintain world order. The economic ad-
vantages will occur even if the weapons are not necessary. Similarly,
there may be a political cost to a leader who decides not to build
mobile systems, even if it is a correct decision 1 If either the United
States or the Soviet Union deploys mobile weapons because of these
pressures, however, the resulting force imbalance would cause the
other state to respond by deploying mobile weapons of its own.
Another argument favoring deployment is that bargaining posi-
tions in SALT negotiations will be improved if mobile weapons can
be used as "bargaining chips." This argument contends that each side
in the SALT negotiations feels it can wrest more concessions from
the other if it offers to limit a mobile ICBM system that is already
deployed, as opposed to foregoing a potential system. The use of bar-
gaining chips would improve the effort toward prevention if their
use makes SALT agreements more likely to occur. The United States
may develop mobile weapons in order to have something to bargain
with in SALT 11.96 In this case, the United States' activities would
have value as a bargaining chip only if the Soviets have some interest,
on balance, in avoiding a situation where both sides independently
deploy mobile weapons.97
B. Special Soviet Considerations Favoring
Mobile ICBM Deployment
The Soviet Union has been more reluctant than the United States
to limit mobile ICBM's because their current forces are facing a greater
threat of preemptive attack. The United States' strategic missiles are
more accurate and the number of warheads it can deliver is larger be-
cause of its lead in multiple-warhead technology.98 Moreover, the So-
viets have a larger proportion of their total strategic force invested
in land-based ICBM's.99 Thus the Soviets face a greater threat to a
relatively larger portion of their forces, and their incentive to deploy
mobile weapons is correspondingly increased.
95. See generally RATHJENS, CHAYES & RUINA, supra note 27, at 53.
96. See generally SIPRI YEARBOOK 1973, supra note 1, at 16.
97. Theoretical problems in constructing weapons strategies include the difficulty of
anticipating the opponent's values. See THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT, supra note 17, at 117.
98. OFFENSIVE MISSILES, supra note 8, at 20-21.
99. The United States has 1,710 launchers, 1,054 of which are ICBM's. The Soviet
Union has 2,075 launchers, 1,618 of which are ICBM's. OFFENSIVE MISSILES, supra note 8,
at 20; T. MooRER, supra note 31, at 10. The Soviets will probably substitute submarine
launched missiles for some of their older ICBM's, however, as they are allowed to do
under the SALT I Interim Agreement. Id. at 12.
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A second special factor in considering Soviet incentives to deploy
mobile weapons is the bureaucratic structure of the Soviet command.
Unlike the United States, the U.S.S.R. has designated a separate branch
of their armed services to operate their land-based ICBM's.100 If these
weapons become obsolete because of U.S. ability to destroy them in
a preemptive strike, an entire branch of the Soviet armed services
would also become obsolete. Thus there are pressures for giving the
Soviet missiles mobility in order to maintain the viability of that
branch of the armed forces, even if the Soviets' other interests were
best served by avoiding deployment. 01
C. Arguments Opposing Mobile ICBM Deployment
Opposition to deployment stems, first, from three characteristics of
mobile ICBM's which make them an undesirable method of achieving
sanctioning objectives; second, from the belief that deployment would
defeat attempts at prevention because arms control would be made
more difficult; and third, because deployment is not necessary to pro-
vide military deterrence. The first of the three undesirable character-
istics is that a mobile ICBM system would be more expensive than
conventional land-based strategic forces. Not only would there be costs
for research and development, but the expense of building new mis-
siles and launchers would be huge. Mobile ICBM's would also need
much more extensive support facilities than conventional ICBM's, be-
cause of their mobile character. 0
2
Second, mobile ICBM's are intrusive. The fact that they will be
moved from one location to another means that more people would
have the missiles stationed near them, or at least traveling nearby. This
becomes a key factor in favor of the U.S. method of using airplanes
to launch the missiles, since putting missiles on already existing air-
bases would not intrude upon civilians. Such placement partially de-
feats the purpose of mobile weapons, however, since the grouping of
missiles on airbases would make them easier targets for preemptive
attack.10
3
100. M. GALLAGHER & K. SPIELMANN, SOVIET DECISION-MAKING FOR DEFENSE 38 (1972).
101. See generally id. at 47; R. KoL~owicz, M. GALLAGHER & B. LAMBETH, THE SoVIET
UNION AND ARMS CONTROL: A SUPERPOWER DILEMMA 13-14 (1970).
102. The exact costs of mobile ICBM deployment are dependent upon the scale and
method of deployment. The indications are that the costs would be very large. Coffey,
American Interests in the Limitation of Strategic Armaments, in SALT: THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1970's, supra note 1, at 79; QUANBEtK 8 BLECHMAN, supra note
19, at 38.
103. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has the ability to destroy nearly all of
the more than 40 bomber and tanker bases in the United States. Hearings on Dep't of
Defense Appropriations for 1972 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropria-
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Third, the deployment of mobile ICBM's would create serious se-
curity problems because protecting the missiles from theft would be
more difficult. Theft of a missile might lead to blackmail and the
feats the purpose of mobile weapons, however, since the grouping of
destruction of a city. 04 To the extent that the security protecting the
missiles is increased, their obtrusiveness would also increase.' 0
A broader and more important reason opposing mobile ICBM de-
ployment is that deployment would defeat attempts at prevention by
frustrating efforts to limit strategic offensive forces.' 06 Information
on the location of ICBM's can be obtained by satellite reconnaissance,
but there is a time lag while the information is retrieved and an-
alyzed.1°O If portions of the observed state's forces are being moved
at all times, the missiles can never be accurately counted. To the ex-
tent that verification is a prerequisite to arms control, the likelihood
of limiting mobile weapons is reduced.
Although the exact number of mobile ICBM's could never be ascer-
tained once they are deployed, there would still be potential for arms
limitation that is not predicated upon precise verification. A reliable
estimate of the number of deployed mobile ICBM's could be made
on the basis of the size of the support facilities, or on approximations
of the total number of mobile ICBM's as a multiple of those which
are observed by satellite. 08 Through these methods, general limits
placed on mobile ICBM's could be enforced.10 9 Nonetheless, despite
the workability of a partial ban, complete prohibition of mobile
ICBM's remains strongly preferable since verification would be simpli-
fied and more accurate; neither side could deploy more than a few
mobile ICBM's without their being detected by satellite reconnaissance.
Finally, mobile ICBM deployment is not necessary to provide mili-
tary deterrence. Even if there were a completely successful preemptive
attack destroying all land-based nuclear weapons, the strategic bombers
and nuclear armed submarines would still survive.110 The submarines
tions, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, at 304 (1971). The aircraft are viable against a first strike
only if they can take off before being destroyed. Id. There are potential threats which
reduce the time the aircraft would have in which to become airborne. See note 115 infra.
104. Recent terrorist activities in the Middle East illustrate the fact that states are
not the only participants in international processes of coercion. See McDOUGAL 9- FELICIANO,
supra note 3, at 171-73.
105. This is assumed because the easiest way to increase protection would be an
increase in the escort party. R. BARNET', WHO WANTS DISARMAMENT? 99 (1960).
106. OFFENSIVE MISSILES, supra note 8, at 28.
107. Greenwood, supra note 76, at 225.
108. See generally RATHJENS, CHAYEs & RUINA, supra note 27, at 57.
109. Id.
110. Mobile ICBM deployment is urged because land-based forces, not all forces, are
threatened by high-accuracy MIRV's. OFFENSIVE MIsSILES, supra note 8, at 28.
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especially are immune from attack because no effective means of track-
ing submarines exists at present, and it is unlikely that such a capability
will be developed in the foreseeable future."' Of course, there is a
military reluctance to concede the vulnerability of the land-based de-
terrent, but there is no reason to believe that submarines do not
provide adequate military deterrence." 2
Mobile ICBM systems would not necessarily add to military deter-
rence because it is questionable whether they can adequately perform
their purpose of protecting ICBM's from preemptive attack. For ex-
ample, if the Soviets deploy a rail-launched or truck-launched mobile
system, they will probably position their mobile weapons on roads
or railroads that are not heavily used, to minimize both the weapons'
obtrusiveness and their vulnerability in case of an attack on the cities.
ICBM's weigh a great deal, however, and so the roads or rails would
have to be heavy-duty. If there is only a limited amount of heavy-duty
but little-used road or rail capacity, an American preemptive attack
could be increased to cover all of those locations and thus be effective
in destroying Soviet land-based retaliatory capacity. It would be easier
to destroy a mobile ICBM than a fixed-site ICBM, because the mobile
weapon would not be protected by a silo.1 3
The United States' system of putting ICBM's in airplanes which
would take off and launch the missiles from the air would also be
ineffective in protecting the missiles if the airplanes could not take
off before they were destroyed by Soviet missiles. An airplane on an
inland U.S. base would have sufficient time to take off in an attack
from the continental Soviet Union." 4 The airplanes might be vul-
nerable, however, to a missile fired on a depressed trajectory, launched
from a Soviet submarine just off our coast.115
The objectives of restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction,
which concern the reestablishment of order after a violation, are in-
volved in the decision whether to deploy mobile ICBM's to the extent
111. Antisubmarine Warfare, supra note 45, at 145. See J. STONE, CONTAINING THE
ARMS RACE 146-52 (1966).
112. See generally ANNUAL DEFENSE DEP'T REPORT FY 1975, supra note 8, at 49.
113. For an analysis of the extent to which silos provide protection, see OFFENSIVE
MIsSILES, supra note 8, at 22.
114. Over-the-horizon radar and new satellite surveillance which can detect enemy
ICBM launchings give the Strategic Air Command approximately 30 minutes warning
time. QUANBECK 9: BLECHMAN, supra note 19, at 34.
115. Soviet submarines deployed within 100 miles of our shores could fire their
missiles on depressed trajectories at our airbases which would cut our reaction time to
six minutes. While there is no indication that the Soviets are developing depressed
trajectory SLBM's (submarine launched ballistic missiles), or that they would risk station-
ing them so close to the United States, this potential ability lessens the desirability of
air-based mobile ICBM deployment. See QUANBECK & BLECHMAN, supra note 19, at 85.
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that such deployment impairs arms control agreements. If verification
difficulties after deployment make agreements less likely, the whole
process of SALT will be weakened. In an atmosphere of mistrust
where states are unwilling to regulate force levels to maintain world
order, they are less likely to enter into agreements which regulate
their action after a violation of that order.
III. United States Policy in Regulating Mobile
ICBM's: Appraisal and Recommendation
In order to decide whether to create international law regulating
mobile ICBM's (in the course of SALT II or elsewhere), policymakers
should determine how interests of world order are best served. From
the perspective of United States policymakers, the questions are first,
whether the advantages preserved by limiting mobile ICBM's are
worth the costs of losing the weapon's potential, and second, if this
limitation is in the interests of the United States, what should the
country be willing to concede in order to obtain an agreement.
In the current strategic context, it is in the best interest of world
order to ban, or at least limit, mobile ICBM's. The arguments for
and against mobile ICBM deployment can only be resolved contex-
tually, for the demands of world order vary over time. Both sides of
the mobile ICBM debate are concerned with protection from viola-
tions of world order."" The argument for deployment which seeks
the objective of prevention is concerned with maintaining balanced
force levels. Balanced forces, however, can be obtained through ne-
gotiations as well as through unilateral response to technological de-
velopments.
The primary objective in prevention of violations of world order
through the use of strategic weapons is to maintain a situation where
continued limitation of armaments, even measured disarmament, is
most likely. If mobile ICBM's are regulated or prohibited, verifica-
tion capabilities will not be reduced and additional arms control will
be encouraged, enhancing, in turn, the possibility of achieving all
five of the SALT objectives. This regulation would be especially sig-
nificant with respect to deterrence, for arguments favoring deployment
claim that mobile ICBM's would increase military deterrence. In-
creased arms control can provide other types of deterrence as well,
including economic, diplomatic and ideological sanctions.
117
116. See generally McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 11-12.
117. See generally MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIc, sup'a note 4, at 422-24.
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Mobile ICBM deployment is not necessary in the context of the
United States' present overall deterrent levels. If alternative weapons
systems become vulnerable, the advantages of mobile ICBM deploy-
ment would increase. For example, if the United States submarine-
based deterrent should become vulnerable to Soviet attack, mobile
ICBM deployment might become critical to deterrence and mainten-
ance of world order. As long as the United States has a sufficiently
large lead time in anticipating Soviet threats to alternative forces,
however, there is no need to deploy mobile ICBM's.
United States policymakers must realize that the Soviet Union is
confronted with more pressures to deploy mobile ICBM's, given the
present superiority of United States technology and the structure of
the Soviet bureaucracy. Accordingly, the Soviets may require that the
United States make certain concessions before the Soviets will agree
to regulate mobile ICBM's. The United States must recognize that a
limit on mobile ICBM's actually represents larger concessions by the
Soviets, and policymakers in the United States must be willing to
make additional concessions in return. The Washington and London
Naval Conferences illustrate the situation where the optimal basis
for comparing weapons reductions is not to define a numerical co-
efficient, but to concede the minimum forces that each side considers
necessary to maintain deterrence.118 The American concessions should
be limited in time; they would be reevaluated as the Soviet offensive
posture improves.
Four recommendations can be made concerning the nature of con-
cessions that the United States should be willing to make to the Soviet
Union. First, the United States should vigorously seek an agreement
which totally bans mobile ICBM's. Since no mobile ICBM's are de-
ployed at present, the agreement would provide simply for a con-
tinuation of the status quo. A total ban on mobile ICBM's would be
the easiest agreement to verify, since the United States already veri-
fies that no Soviet mobile ICBM's are deployed and could detect the
introduction of any significant number of missiles. Verification is often
considered to be a prerequisite to arms control, and a total ban would
preserve opportunities for additional arms control agreements. Mobile
ICBM's do not need to be deployed for military deterrence because
there are already alternative means of effective military deterrence,
and because mobile ICBM's may be vulnerable to enemy attack. More-
over, deployment, by decreasing opportunities for arms control and
118. Bull, supra note 33, at 42.
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adding an element to military deterrence, also reduces opportunities
for economic, diplomatic and ideological deterrence. A total ban would
be in the United States' best interests because it already has a lead in
counterforce ability resulting from the greater accuracy of its warheads.
A total ban would be of significant advantage in curtailing devel-
opment of mobile ICBM technology and its spin-offs, since, without
immediate uses for the technology, the pressure to develop it is bound
to be reduced. Once deployed, any weapons system inexorably tends
to be upgraded, and can therefore lead to new threats to world order.
Moreover, it is unlikely that systems once deployed will ever be
phased out.
The second recommendation is that the United States be willing,
if a total ban fails, to concede to Soviet demands for a partial ban
on mobile ICBM's. The Soviet Union, because of the United States'
counterforce capabilities and the structure of the Soviet military bu-
reaucracy, may feel sufficiently threatened to insist upon having at
least a minimal land-mobile force. 119
Critics of a partial ban might argue that the United States could
not verify whether the Soviets would exceed any limit set by a SALT
Treaty. The United States, however, should be willing to accept a
partial limit because the potential for cheating would not be dangerous
to its interests. The existence of unauthorized Soviet missiles, con-
sidering the already high force levels on both sides, would not be
sufficient to pose a threat to United States military deterrence. 12 0 The
Soviets would have little incentive to cheat, not only because it would
serve no military purpose, but also because there is a high probability
that the truth would ultimately be revealed by a defector or other
alternative source of verification.12 1 If the Soviets ever used the addi-
tional missiles for propaganda, such use would be self-defeating; it
would be an admission that they had cheated.
The third recommendation is that the United States should be
119. The size of a small Soviet mobile ICBM force might range from 100 to 300
mobile launchers, which could probably be verified within an error margin no greater
than 100 percent (i.e., we would know if they had more than 200 to 600 launchers).
Verification becomes more difficult as the size of the force allowed under the treaty is
increased.
120. The marginal number of launchers we would not be able to detect would be
insufficient to shift strategic balances, since the large number of forces already deployed
make small numerical advantages militarily worthless. See Summary of Discussion, in
ImIpAcr OF NEw TECHNOLOGIES ON THE ARMS RACE, supra note 22, at 339.
121. See Falk, Inspection, Trust, and Security During Disarmament, in SECURITY IN
DISARMAMENT, supra note 24, at 39-40. See generally SCHELLING & HALPERIN, supra note 2,
at 99.
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willing to link a mobile ICBM limit with limits on MIRV's and
cruise missiles. These high accuracy weapons are the cause of Soviet
concern over vulnerability, and if they were limited sufficiently to
reduce the threat to Soviet forces, the Soviet concern would be signi-
ficantly reduced. The Soviet bureaucracy, no longer threatened by the
obsolescence of immobile land-based forces, would be more willing to
ban mobile weapons. Moves of this kind would involve a significant
concession by the United States since its high accuracy weapons are
much better than the Soviets'. It would not mean that the United
States would have to limit itself to fewer or poorer weapons than the
Soviets have, but rather that each side would agree not to develop a
potential for a preemptive strike against the other's ICBM's. The
United States would be conceding more to the Soviets in such an
agreement, because it is closer to having a preemptive potential.122
The fourth recommendation is that a limitation agreement should
not allow the Soviets to deploy more mobile ICBM's than the United
States. Even if the Soviets argue a greater need for mobile ICBM's, the
United States should not allow them to have more, since the Soviet
numerical advantage could outlive their current greater need, leaving
the Soviets in an advantageous position. Instead, if a partial ban is
the best that can be achieved, the United States should accommodate
the Soviet need for mobile weapons by allowing each side to deploy
a limited number, perhaps accompanied by a reduction in the Soviet
need through curtailment of the United States' preemptive threat.
Moreover, any numerical advantage given to the Soviets might be




The United States and Soviet Union need to encompass all five
sanctioning goals in future SALT agreements. Maintenance of world
order through arms control requires that all concerned states partici-
pate; that pressures which tend to cause force imbalances and frus-
trate prevention be eliminated; that all methods of deterrence, not
122. This would be similar to concessions made to the Soviets in SALT I, based on
United States superiority in missile accuracy. See T. MooRr-R, supra note 31, at 2.
123. In a Joint Resolution accepting the force level agreement of SALT I, Congress
requested that the President seek future agreements which "would not limit the United
States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to limits provided for the Soviet
Union." Pub. L. No. 92-448, 86 Stat. 746 (H.R.J. Res. 1227, Sept. 30, 1972).
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just the military, be used as sanctions; and that methods of minimizing
damage after violations be incorporated into SALT agreements.
Mobile ICBM deployment would have several deleterious conse-
quences for world order, and the United States should work whole-
heartedly for a total ban. If the apparently greater Soviet need for
mobile ICBM's prevents a total ban, a creative partial ban should
be sought, perhaps linking mobile ICBM regulation with MIRV or
accuracy limitations. Above all, mobile ICBM development should
be brought under agreed regulation, since unlimited competitive de-
velopment provides real risks to world order.
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